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Changing Caseloads: 
Macro Influences and 
Micro Composition
he unprecedented decline in the caseload of the Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, 
retitled the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) 
program in 1996, has been, by common agreement, remark-
able. The caseload has declined by 50 percent since its peak in 
1994 and is now at a level roughly similar to what it was in the 
late 1970s. It is also generally agreed that welfare reform has 
played a role in this decline, albeit simultaneously with the 
effects of the strong economy and of other policy measures. 
The welfare reform movement that was solidified in the 1996 
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation 
Act (PRWORA) actually began in the early 1990s, and 
contributed to the caseload decline prior to 1996. The economy 
played a stronger role in that period than did welfare reform. 
However, subsequent to 1996, the economy has played the 
lesser role, according to estimates from currently available 
studies (Mayer 2000; Moffitt 1999; Schoeni and Blank 2000; 
Council of Economic Advisers 1997, 1999). Also playing a role 
of rather uncertain magnitude have been expansions of the 
earned income tax credit and Medicaid eligibility; both of these 
reforms greatly increased the amount of resources made 
available to families off welfare.
Research studies to date have also examined the effect of 
welfare reform on employment outcomes and other individual 
and family outcomes, as well as effects on the caseload. Two 
types of studies have been conducted. By far, the more 
numerous have been studies of welfare leavers: women who 
have left the AFDC or TANF rolls after welfare reform began. 
These studies generally have shown leavers to have employ-
ment rates in the range of 50 to 70 percent, considerably higher 
than expected (Brauner and Loprest 1999; U.S. General 
Accounting Office 1999; Isaacs and Lyon 2000; Acs and Loprest 
2001). Unfortunately, these studies do not estimate the effect of 
welfare reform per se because they do not control for the 
influence of the economy, which has improved considerably 
over the same period and could have contributed to these 
favorable outcomes.1 A second strand of research study 
examines the effect of welfare reform on employment and 
other outcomes of all single mothers, or sometimes all less 
educated women, regardless of their welfare participation 
status (Moffitt 1999; Schoeni and Blank 2000). These studies 
control for the state of the economy, and typically have found 
positive effects on employment and earnings.2
The issue addressed in this paper is how welfare reform has 
affected the types of women who have remained on the welfare 
rolls (sometimes called stayers, as opposed to leavers). This 
group has not been examined by either of the two types of 
studies just referred to. Yet those women remaining on the rolls 
are also of policy interest. By and large, it is expected that those 
women are the most disadvantaged recipients who have not yet 
been able to find jobs in the growing economy or who have 
some significant health or other problem that prevents them 
from being able to leave the rolls or to work. If this is the case, 
such a disadvantaged group, still in need of a safety net, 
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deserves attention and calls for the development of policies to 
address its needs. However, as was the case in studies of leavers, 
ascertaining that more disadvantaged women remain on the 
rolls does not say whether that is a result of the economy or of 
welfare reform; a low unemployment rate would also tend to 
draw women with more labor market skills off the welfare rolls. 
Determining the net effect of welfare reform requires 
controlling for the business cycle, as some of the other studies 
cited above have done for other outcomes.
Our analysis is composed of three parts. First, we provide a 
discussion of what the effects of welfare reform on the 
composition of the caseload—primarily measured by labor 
market skill level—should be, in principle. Perhaps surpris-
ingly, we argue that different welfare reform policies have 
different effects on more skilled versus less skilled recipients, 
and that the net effect of the policies taken together is mixed 
and ambiguous. Second, we provide some new evidence from 
the nation as a whole using Current Population Survey (CPS) 
data, and from the state of Maryland using administrative 
caseload and earnings data. Third, we summarize what the few 
other studies of welfare stayers have shown.
Our analysis indicates that, after controlling for the effects of 
the economy, there is little evidence in national CPS data that 
welfare reform has affected the composition of the caseload in 
its labor market skill distribution, indirectly implying therefore 
that leavers have been equally distributed across all skill types. 
The analysis of data from Maryland indicates, in addition, a 
disproportionate effect of welfare reform on long-term 
recipients on the welfare rolls, who are the most disadvantaged, 
although not necessarily resulting in their departure from 
welfare. Other studies comparing leavers with stayers find as a 
whole that the former are more job-ready than the latter, but 
this could be the result of the growing economy and is 
inconsistent with the CPS, which shows a decline in the skill 
level of the caseload prior to adjustment for the business cycle. 
On net, therefore, we find no strong evidence that welfare 
reform per se has been selective in who has left the rolls and 
who has stayed in terms of labor market skills.
I. Expected Effects of Welfare 
Reform on Caseload Composition
The common theory of the main determinants of why some 
women are on welfare and others are not is based on a standard 
economic framework, which views welfare participation as 
resulting from a trade-off between potential income off welfare 
and potential income on welfare. Holding constant the latter, 
usually measured by the level of the welfare benefit, women 
with greater income off welfare are less likely to be on the rolls 
and those with less income off welfare are more likely to be on 
the rolls. Since labor market earnings are a major source of 
income off the rolls, this leads to the natural presumption that 
women with greater labor market skills should be off welfare 
and those with lesser skills should more likely be on welfare.3 
The composition of the rolls over time can be expected to 
change, according to this framework, if either the benefit level 
or labor market opportunities off the rolls change. If benefits 
trend downward, for example, one should expect the caseload 
to become increasingly disadvantaged in terms of labor market 
skills, and the same should occur if labor market opportunities 
improve.
The caseload should change in composition over the 
business cycle as well according to this framework. As the 
unemployment rate rises, one should expect women with more 
labor market skills to come onto the welfare rolls and hence the 
average skill level of welfare recipients should rise. Such women 
are ordinarily employed but lose their jobs during economic 
downturns. Likewise, as the unemployment rate falls, one 
should expect women with greater labor market skills to leave 
the rolls as they find jobs, leaving the caseload increasingly 
composed of more disadvantaged recipients.
When the features of welfare reform in the 1990s are 
considered, a more detailed examination is required. The 
overall emphasis of 1990s welfare reform has unquestionably 
been to increase employment of welfare recipients, and to this 
extent one might expect the most employable women to leave 
the welfare rolls first and the least employable recipients to stay 
on the rolls and to leave later, if ever. However, there are 
countervailing pressures at work, as can be seen by a more 
careful consideration of the main elements of reform: work 
requirements, sanctions, more generous earnings disregards, 
and time limits.
Work requirements should, at one level, make welfare less 
attractive in general and should lead some women to leave the 
welfare rolls. Naturally, the women who can leave most easily 
are those with greater labor market skills. An important 
question, however, is whether such requirements lead to work 
while on the rolls instead of work off the rolls. States that count 
earnings against the welfare grant, as most do, may make some 
women who earn sufficient amounts of money from 
employment ineligible for benefits and hence lead to their 
departure from welfare. However, those women who do not 
earn enough to render themselves ineligible will stay on the 
rolls and will combine welfare and work. The question 
regarding work requirements is how they will affect those 
women who have barriers to employment, such as health 
problems, low levels of education and work experience, or 
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disadvantaged women are exempted from work requirements, 
they will be unaffected; but to the extent that they are not 
exempted (and the tendency in many states is to minimize the 
number of exempt categories), they will find work 
requirements more onerous to fulfill. This could lead to an 
inability to meet those requirements and lead to a departure 
from the rolls, possibly working in the opposite direction to the 
main effects of work requirements.4
Sanctions that are imposed for noncompliance with work 
requirements should, similarly, work toward the departure 
from the rolls of more disadvantaged rather than less disadvant- 
aged women. Women who are more job-ready and have fewer 
barriers to work are most likely to be able to comply with work 
requirements and hence avoid sanctions, while women who 
have more barriers related to health, child-care problems, or 
difficulties at home or in their personal life are likely to have a 
more difficult time complying and hence are more likely to be 
sanctioned. Indeed, the evidence to date is that women who 
have left the rolls after being sanctioned have lower employ-
ment rates and higher poverty rates than other leavers and are, 
in general, a more disadvantaged group (Brauner and Loprest 
1999; Moffitt and Roff 2000; U.S. General Accounting Office 
2000). Thus, sanctions work against the usual presumption 
that the most advantaged are more likely to leave the rolls.
More generous earnings disregards also work against this 
presumption, at least in relative terms.5 Such disregards have 
an employment-inducing effect by encouraging women to 
combine welfare and work and hence to hold jobs while still on 
welfare. They therefore tend to increase the welfare rolls by 
discouraging women from leaving welfare for work and 
encouraging women who might otherwise not have come onto 
welfare to do so, knowing that they can work while on the rolls. 
The women most capable of taking advantage of more 
generous earnings disregards are the more job-ready women 
who have sufficient education and work experience to find and 
retain employment. The women least able to take advantage of 
disregards are those with the poorest work skills and those with 
the most difficult problems in their personal and family life.6
Finally, the effects of time limits on caseload composition 
are complex and not easy to predict. In the short run, to the 
extent that the existence of time limits causes some women to 
leave the rolls before the time limit is reached, possibly in order 
to “bank” their benefits, it should be expected that more job-
ready recipients would be more easily able to find jobs and 
leave the rolls early. However, in the longer run, as time limits 
are reached, women who are more disadvantaged will remain 
on the rolls and will actually be observed to hit the limit and be 
terminated. At that point, the more disadvantaged women are 
more likely to leave welfare. States may grant extensions from 
the time limits to some of these types of recipients as well as use 
their 20 percent time-limit exemption for such women, thereby 
ameliorating their impact. But even these short-run and long-
run effects depend on the extent to which state policy 
encourages women to work on the rolls before they hit the 
limit, and the extent to which such encouragement extends to 
disadvantaged as well as advantaged women (Moffitt and 
Pavetti 2000). The more women stay on the rolls to work prior 
to the limit, the more likely they will still be on the rolls when 
the time limit is reached.
In summary, while the general tendency of welfare reform is 
to encourage more job-ready recipients and those with more 
education and work experience to leave the rolls—leaving 
behind the more disadvantaged women—there are tendencies 
in the opposite direction as well. Sanction policies and more 
generous earnings disregards, as well as elements of other 
policies, will tend to retain more job-ready women on the rolls 
and/or lead to the departure from the rolls of the more 
disadvantaged recipients.
II. New Evidence
Analysis of the Current Population Survey 
The ideal data set for a study of national trends in the 
composition of the AFDC and TANF caseloads would be a 
national data set with information on the characteristics of 
recipients over several years, including different periods of the 
business cycle. Many characteristics of families are of interest, 
including the education, work experience, health, and other 
characteristics of the single mother herself, as well as the 
number and ages of her children and their health status; also, 
information on others in the household and the type of income 
they can provide. Information on the mother’s history of 
welfare participation would be useful to determine whether she 
is a long-term recipient.
Unfortunately, such a data set does not exist. Administrative 
data on recipient characteristics in all states have been collected 
in a series of changing formats since 1969, providing some 
information on recipients, but most data are drawn from the 
AFDC or TANF records themselves, leading to a variable list far 
shorter than the list noted above. National survey data sets 
generally are weak as well, often having very small sample sizes 
of recipients (as in the national longitudinal data sets) or a 
limited number of years available (the Survey of Program 
Dynamics). Probably the best national survey for this purpose 
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been available since 1984, but it has been very slow to release 
data, and very little information subsequent to 1996 has yet 
been provided to the public. A next-best national data set is the 
March Current Population Survey, which is used here.
The CPS has strong advantages for this type of study. It is 
available back to 1968 on an annual basis and through 1999, 
and it contains reasonably large sample sizes of single mothers. 
It is nationally representative and most questions have been 
consistently asked across the years. It contains information on 
nonwelfare recipients as well as welfare recipients, which is 
needed in order to disentangle trends in characteristics that 
have occurred for all single mothers from those that have been 
experienced by single mothers on welfare per se.7 
However, the CPS has major disadvantages as well. The 
survey takes place in March of each year and obtains 
information on earnings, weeks of work, and welfare receipt 
during the prior calendar year, but respondents are not asked 
week-by-week questions, which would allow a determination 
of whether welfare receipt and work occurred at the same time. 
Most individual and family characteristics are measured as of 
the March interview, which does not coincide with the time at 
which welfare participation is measured. The characteristics of 
the single mother obtained are very sparse, and consist only of 
the usual crude socioeconomic markers—age, education, and 
so on. There is essentially no information on the indicators of 
serious disadvantage that are present in the worst-off portions 
of the welfare caseload—poor health of mother or children, 
substance abuse, a history of welfare dependency, very little 
work history, and so on. Also, the data are not longitudinal in 
nature, and hence a woman’s movements on and off welfare 
over time cannot be tracked. Nevertheless, the CPS is used here 
because it is the only nationally representative data set that has 
a long enough history to estimate business cycle effects.8 
The main characteristics of the single mother that we use to 
indicate labor market skill are her level of education and the 
level of hourly wage rates of jobs she has held over the past 
calendar year.9 Hourly wage rates are the best single indicator 
of where in the hierarchy of skill in the labor market an 
individual is located. We also look at other characteristics in the 
CPS pertaining to family structure and marital status (family 
size, whether the single mother has ever been married), some 
other personal characteristics (age, race), and some labor 
market attachment variables (earnings, weeks of work, 
employment status). Note that these last three variables do not 
measure skill per se but rather outcomes that themselves are 
changed by the business cycle and, possibly, by welfare reform; 
they are not markers of whether the caseload is becoming more 
or less disadvantaged in terms of labor market skills.
Charts 1 and 2 plot an education measure and the real 
hourly wage rate for AFDC recipients, respectively, together 
with the unemployment rate. The education measure is the 
percentage of recipients who have at least twelve years of 
education.10 It shows a strong upward trend over the past thirty 
years, indicating growth in the educational levels of welfare 
recipients. There is a slight countercyclical pattern in Chart 1, 
showing a positive correlation between the unemployment rate 
and the educational level of welfare recipients. The hourly wage 
rate measure in Chart 2 shows a steady decline from the 1970s 
to the 1980s, but with a slight recovery starting in the late 1980s 
and early 1990s. The relationship to the unemployment rate 
again appears to be roughly countercyclical, with the exception 
of the early 1980s. There appears to be a slight upward 
movement in wages after 1996.
These charts are misleading, however, for they do not show 
trends in the single-mother population as a whole. Educational 
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population, both men and women, over the past three decades. 
Likewise, the hourly wage rates of women in general, and single 
mothers in particular, have been undergoing long-term trends 
that have affected all women, not just mothers on welfare. It 
would be incorrect to attribute long-term trends or any post-
1996 trend to welfare or any other factor if those trends were 
occurring for all single mothers.
Charts 3 and 4 show the trends in the education measure 
and hourly wage measure, respectively, for welfare recipients 
relative to those same measures for nonwelfare recipients.11 
Interestingly, the upward trend the in education of welfare 
recipients appears even here, reflecting a gain relative to 
nonwelfare recipients. As for the period following 1996, it 
appears that educational levels of the welfare recipient 
population are again rising, but it is not clear that they are 
rising any faster than would be expected from the long-term 
trend. The hourly wage rate shows a long-term, secular decline 
relative to nonwelfare recipients and without the gradual 
recovery that was visible in Chart 2. This decline in relative 
wages is probably the result of a deterioration in the demand 
for low-skilled labor that has affected other low-skilled workers 
in the U.S. economy over this same period. The wage rate 
appears to be countercyclical, as should be expected: as the 
unemployment rate rises, higher wage workers come onto the 
welfare rolls. The period in the early 1980s does not 
demonstrate this relationship, however, possibly because the 
1981 OBRA reduced the number of higher wage welfare 
recipients at the same time that the unemployment rate was 
rising. After 1996, there appears to be a decline in the wage rates 
of welfare recipients, but again it is not clear whether it is any 
different from what would be expected from a trend.
Table 1 reports the results of regressions in which these two 
welfare-nonwelfare ratios, as well as similar ratios for other 
variables, are regressed on a time trend, the unemployment 
rate, a dummy for OBRA 1981, and a dummy for 1996 and 
after. The trend coefficients in the first two rows confirm the 
graphical evidence that there have been significant long-term 
trends in both the education and hourly wage rates of welfare 
recipients relative to nonwelfare recipients. The unemploy-
ment coefficients are both positive, although statistically 
significant in only one case, indicating that higher unemploy-
ment rates draw onto the rolls more skilled women in terms of 
education and wage rates. This implies that both educational 
levels and wage rates in the post-1996 period should have been 
falling because of the business cycle alone. The coefficients on 
the 1981+ dummy for OBRA are both negative, indicating that 
more skilled recipients left the rolls because of that legislation. 
Finally, the coefficients in the last column show whether there 
has been a deviation from trend and cycle after 1996; the 
answer is that there has been no significant change. Although 
educational levels have been rising and hourly wage rates of 
recipients falling after 1996, these are not significantly different 
from what would be expected on the basis of trend and cycle. 
Therefore, the CPS provides no evidence that PRWORA has 
been strongly selective in ending welfare participation for 
either more or less disadvantaged women; the best conclusion 
is that both types of women have left the rolls in equal 
proportions.
Table 1 also shows the results of similar regressions for 
other characteristics in the Current Population Survey. The 
caseload has been becoming younger, more white, and more 
composed of never-married mothers over the period, and these 42 Changing Caseloads
characteristics have been changing over the business cycle in 
expected ways: as the unemployment rate rises, women with 
smaller family sizes—who are younger and more likely to be 
white—come onto the rolls. However, there have been no post-
1996 changes in these recipient-nonrecipient ratios after 
netting out the effects of trend and cycle except for the 
proportion that has never been married, which has declined. 
Never-married recipients tend to be more disadvantaged than 
other recipients. 
The last four rows of the table show coefficients for 
regressions with labor market attachment as dependent 
variables—employment, weeks of work, hours of work, and 
annual earnings. All four have risen significantly after 1996, 
even after accounting for trend and cycle. This suggests that 
welfare reform has, indeed, resulted in more work and earnings 
among welfare recipients than was the case prior to 1996.12
Evidence from Maryland 
Another source of data for examining trends in welfare 
recipient characteristics, albeit not national in scope, are 
administrative records from individual states and local areas. 
Many states have assembled records from welfare agency files 
of the characteristics of recipients over a fairly long period of 
time, and these typically have been matched to other 
administrative records, most commonly the earnings data 
from unemployment insurance (UI) files. Such data have the 
advantage of large sample sizes, relatively good administrative 
information on welfare receipt and simultaneous earnings, and 
a moderately long time period (1985 to 2000 in the case of 
Maryland).13 A disadvantage is that the data contain even less 
information on personal and family characteristics than the 
CPS does, and therefore cannot provide a comprehensive 
picture of well-being or an index of advantage and 
disadvantage. The major variable indexing skill comes from the 
match to UI files, where quarterly earnings are available.14
However, a better measure of disadvantage that can be 
constructed from this type of data comes from the availability 
of histories of welfare participation, for in this case we can 
classify recipients by their past level of welfare dependency. 
Long-term recipients are the most obvious subgroup on the 
rolls who are known from other research to be more 
disadvantaged in terms of labor market experience, 
education, health, and other problems; indeed, long-term 
recipiency is, in a sense, an overall measure that is a proxy for 
a large number of problems of disadvantage. We use a slightly 
more detailed classification based on the one initially 
proposed by Bane and Ellwood (1994), which divides the 
caseload into long-termers, short-termers, and cyclers. Long-
termers are those with relatively long spells of welfare receipt 
and generally a relatively small number of individual spells; 
short-termers are those with short spells when on welfare and 
also a small number of spells; and cyclers are those with 
relatively short spell durations but a larger number of spells. 
Long-termers include the most disadvantaged women on 
welfare, while short-termers are presumed to be the least 
disadvantaged and cyclers are in between long-termers and 
short-termers in this dimension.15 We use this classification 
as our primary measure of disadvantage and examine whether 
the relative numbers of these types of recipients have trended 
Table 1
Regression Results for March Current Population 









 education or more .019* .023* -.065 -.053
(.003) (.008) (.044) (.044)
Hourly wage rate -.006* .008 -.075* .032
(.002) (.007) (.026) (.023)
Number in family .001 -.022* .021 .010
(.001) (.004) (.023) (.024)
Less than twenty-five
 years old .009* .021* -.002 -.022
(.001) (.004) (.023) (.023)
White .006* .005* .006 -.003
(.001) (.003) (.014) (.014)
Never married .022* -.006 .065* -.066*
(.001) (.004) (.022) (.022)
Employed over
 the year .006* -.009 -.150* .128*
(.003) (.010) (.038) (.034)
Annual weeks worked .003 -.008 -.164* .122*
(.003) (.009) (.035) (.031)
Hours worked
 per week .003 -.011 -.177* .150*
(.004) (.011) (.043) (.038)
Annual earnings -.002 -.006 -.159* .085*
(.002) (.008) (.030) (.027)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable is
calculated as the ratio of the mean for welfare recipients to the mean for 
single mothers not on welfare in the year in question. Intercept not shown.
 *Statistically significant at the 10 percent level.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 43
over time, have varied with the business cycle, and have 
changed after PRWORA.
The Maryland welfare and earnings data are available for all 
TANF recipients beginning in April 1985 and running through 
March 2000. These files are maintained by The Jacob France 
Center at the University of Baltimore through data-sharing 
agreements with Maryland’s Department of Human Resources 
(DHR) and Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation 
(DLLR). Data are available for all Maryland welfare recipients, 
but the diversity of Maryland’s economy led us to limit the 
analysis reported here to Baltimore City welfare recipients 
alone. 
We use the longitudinal dimension of the data to classify 
women by their welfare dependency status; we use a five-year 
window to do so, using welfare participation within that 
window to classify women into the three dependency groups. 
To examine trends over time, we select different birth cohorts 
of women, each cohort consisting of all women in that cohort 
who were on welfare at least once during the five-year period. 
In the results reported here, we select women who were 
nineteen in the initial year. Thus, for example, our earliest 
cohort consists of women whose nineteenth birthday fell 
between April 1, 1985, and March 31, 1986, whom we follow 
from 1985:2 to 1990:1. Our second cohort consists of women 
whose nineteenth birthday fell between April 1, 1986, and 
March 31, 1987, whom we follow from 1986:2 to 1991:1, and 
so on. The final cohort was age nineteen between the same 
dates in 1995 and 1996, and is followed from 1995:2 to 2000:1. 
For each cohort, we extract all monthly welfare events 
represented in the DHR records and quarterly DLLR wage 
records over the relevant five years and select all women with at 
least one welfare record. We have eleven cohorts; comparing 
these cohorts over time tells us whether the caseload is 
changing in terms of composition, controlling, clearly, for 
age—each cohort is at the same point in its life cycle.16 We 
define a woman as a cycler if she had three or more spells 
during the five years, a long-termer if she had only one or two 
spells and an average spell duration of twenty-one months or 
more, and a short-termer if she had only one or two spells and 
an average spell duration of twenty months or less.17
Some components of welfare reform in Maryland began 
with a federal waiver in October 1995, so we have many months 
of observations after the official beginning of the reforms. 
However, state and local observers encourage the use of 
October 1996 as an appropriate date to expect welfare leaving 
and employment profiles to show a reform effect, for that is the 
approximate date of post-PRWORA TANF implementation. 
The Maryland TANF program has two-year work require-
ments stipulating a minimum of twenty hours per week (in 
accordance with federal law), full family sanctions, a 
35 percent earnings disregard, and a five-year time limit. The 
cyclical pattern of the unemployment rate in Maryland over the 
1985-2000 period is roughly similar to that in the United States 
as a whole, although lower in level. It fell from 4.6 percent in 
1985 to a trough of 3.7 percent in 1989, then rose to a peak of 
6.7 percent in 1992, and has since fallen steadily to 3.5 percent 
in 1999.
Table 2 shows the trend in cohort size as well as the relative 
fractions of women in short-term, cycler, and long-term 
welfare dependency categories over time. The cohort size 
column indicates that the number of young women ever 
receiving welfare in Baltimore City in the five-year period rose 
for the first few cohorts, most of whose observation periods fell 
in the period of rising unemployment from 1989 to 1992. 
It peaked for the 1989-94 cohort and then fell markedly, 
reaching its level for the first cohort by the 1991-96 period. 
Subsequently, it has declined only slightly thereafter through 
the last cohort (in fact, it rose for the last two cohorts). The lack 
of decline in cohort size in the last, post-PRWORA periods 
reflects the fact that entry rates in Baltimore did not decline 
very strongly, at least through 1997 or 1998 (Mueser et al. 2000, 
Figure 2). The caseload did decline, however, because exit rates 
rose.
Table 2
Percentage Distribution of Maryland AFDC-TANF 
Caseload by Welfare Dependency Status 
and Cohort, Ages Nineteen to Twenty-Three









1985:2-1990:1 1,865 35 65 0
1986:2-1991:1 2,234 33 64 3
1987:2-1992:1 2,354 40 56 4
1988:2-1993:1 2,307 41 52 7
1989:2-1994:1 2,388 47 44 9
1990:2-1995:1 2,090 45 47 8
1991:2-1996:1 1,874 46 44 10
1992:2-1997:1 1,604 45 47 8
1993:2-1998:1 1,518 43 48 9
1994:2-1999:1 1,751 19 62 19
1995:2-2000:1 1,754 15 67 18
aFive-year observation period for women who were age nineteen in the 
year beginning with the first quarter indicated.
bLong-termers have one or two spells in the five-year observation period 
and an average spell of twenty-one months or more; short-termers have 
one or two spells in the five-year observation period and an average spell 
of twenty months or less; cyclers have three or more spells in the five-year 
observation period.44 Changing Caseloads
The other columns in Table 2 separate the cohorts into 
short-termer, cycler, and long-termer components. Most of the 
young Baltimore City welfare recipients—between 44 and 
67 percent across all cohorts–are designated as short-termers. 
There are very few cyclers in general, although the number has 
been gradually rising over time. Long-termers are in between in 
terms of size. The trends in composition up through the 1993-98 
cohort are partly explainable in terms of the business cycle. In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the local unemployment rate 
and welfare caseload rose, the percentage of long-term 
recipients drifted upward to a high of 47 percent for the 1990-
95 cohort and fell modestly over the next four cohorts as the 
unemployment rate declined, though not falling perhaps as 
much as would be expected. Mirroring this trend, the 
percentage of the cohort composed of short-termers fell 
initially and then rose slightly through the 1993-98 cohort. 
Interestingly, the percentage composed of cyclers rose during 
the rise in the unemployment rate as well, but then roughly 
stabilized.
The last two cohorts show a marked change in composition, 
with a sharp drop in the percentage of long-termers and a sharp 
rise in the percentage of short-termers and cyclers. The 
unemployment rate was continuing to decline over this period, 
but at a steady rate that could not explain the suddenness of the 
caseload composition change, which is therefore almost surely 
the result of welfare reform. The abruptness of the change also 
suggests that welfare reform in Baltimore affected primarily 
those young recipients who had recently entered the rolls, for 
the last two cohorts are observed for almost their entire five-
year period after welfare reform. The earlier cohorts began 
their observation period prior to reform.
These findings go against the conventional wisdom for how 
welfare reform should affect the composition of the caseload, 
for the usual presumption is that the percentage of the caseload 
composed of long-termers should markedly rise after reform, 
as short-termers and cyclers leave the rolls for the labor market. 
The opposite has occurred in Maryland, where long-termers 
have declined as a fraction of the ever-on five-year caseload. It 
is quite likely that women who would have been long-termers 
in the absence of reform are now short-termers and cyclers, 
and that welfare reform has caused a reduction in the number 
of long spells while on welfare. Note that this does not imply 
that those who would have been long-termers have left the 
rolls; indeed, the cohort size rose slightly over the last two 
cohorts.18 However, it does imply that it is among the long-
termers where welfare policy has had its greatest impact in 
Baltimore.
Tables 3-5 offer additional details on how the characteristics 
of the young Baltimore caseload has changed over time. Table 3 
shows trends in the total percentage of time on welfare over the 
five-year period—sometimes called the “total time on”—which 
is one of the best overall measures of welfare dependency. The 
first column shows a marked rise in welfare dependency, from 
31 percent of the five years on welfare to a high of 51 percent 
for the 1991-96 cohort. The percentage of time on subse-
quently declined at about the same time as the unemployment 
rate, and then dropped more precipitously as the 1990s ended, 
returning to the beginning level of approximately one-third of 
the five years spent in welfare dependency. Again, this abrupt 
decline is almost surely the result of welfare reform. The other 
columns show that this welfare reform change was the result of 
two, complementary changes: a drop in the total time on 
among those who remained as long-termers and a slight drop 
among those who were short-termers and cyclers. Even if these 
welfare dependency levels within groups had not changed, the 
shift from long-termers to short-termers and cyclers apparent 
in Table 2 would have generated a reduction in overall total 
time on. The reductions in total time on within each group, 
particularly among long-termers, reinforce this.19
Table 4 shows trends in the mean quarterly earnings of the 
women during the quarters in which they were not receiving 
welfare benefits. Real earnings rose steadily through the mid-
Table 3
Percentage of Five-Year Period on AFDC-TANF, 







1985:2-1990:1 31 57 18 22
1986:2-1991:1 34 56 23 39
1987:2-1992:1 39 59 25 44
1988:2-1993:1 43 64 25 51
1989:2-1994:1 49 71 24 59
1990:2-1995:1 49 73 24 59
1991:2-1996:1 51 74 25 58
1992:2-1997:1 49 73 25 59
1993:2-1998:1 48 72 25 60
1994:2-1999:1 37 67 20 61
1995:2-2000:1 32 54 20 57
Note: Percentage of time on welfare is defined as the fraction of the sixty 
months in the five-year observation period in which the woman received 
an AFDC or TANF payment.
aFive-year observation period for women who were age nineteen in the 
year beginning with the first quarter indicated.
bLong-termers have one or two spells in the five-year observation period 
and an average spell of twenty-one months or more; short-termers have 
one or two spells in the five-year observation period and an average spell 
of twenty months or less; cyclers have three or more spells in the five-year 
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1990s, both overall and for the individual dependency groups. 
If earnings are taken as a measure of wage rates, which they 
proxy only slightly, this is consistent with the more skilled 
women being on the rolls than was the case for cohorts in 
which the unemployment rate was lower. However, earnings 
have more or less leveled off over the past few cohorts, even 
though the unemployment rate has declined (there is 
considerable fluctuation, but no consistent upward or 
downward trend). These results are fairly surprising, for the 
marked decline in the unemployment rate should have led to a 
decline in wage rates as the caseload became less skilled (again, 
quarterly earnings is at best a proxy for wage rates); however, 
real earnings did, at least, level off, and no longer continue to 
rise.20
These figures do not capture labor market skill levels in the 
same way the hourly wage does because they do not control for 
the employment rate and for hours of work. The former can at 
least partly be adjusted for by calculating what earnings over 
the entire five-year period would be if each individual had 
worked in all twenty quarters and had earned in each quarter 
the off-welfare amounts shown in Table 4; we term this their 
“human capital potential.”21 The first column of Table 5 shows 
how the five-year earnings of each cohort have changed relative 
to this human capital potential, showing that they have risen 
gradually and then increased sharply recently. This calculation 
implies a more definitive increase in employment and work 
effort than was implied in Table 4. The second column shows 
the ratio of this human capital potential to a measure of full-
year, full-time work at the minimum wage over the full five 
years. This measure has also increased over the eleven cohorts, 
but with some unevenness. There has been some increase in the 
average earnings capacity of the caseload, but the effects in the 
last three cohorts, which are the main post-reform periods, are 
not as strong relative to previous periods as might be expected.
III. Other Evidence
There is a scattering of additional evidence from other sources 
relevant to the issues discussed thus far, even though none is 
definitive and none controls for the business cycle. One source 
is administrative data from AFDC and TANF records on the 
characteristics of recipients over time. Such data have been 
collected sporadically since 1969, but not always on a 
comparable basis. For present purposes, the main variable of 
interest is educational attainment, which has been collected on 
and off over the years. The figures in Table 6 show how it has 
changed over time. There was a dramatic improvement in the 
educational level of AFDC adults from 1969 to 1994 in terms of 
Table 4
Mean Quarterly Earnings While off Welfare, by Cohort 







1985:2-1990:1 1,313 1,201 1,361 1,762
1986:2-1991:1 1,498 1,232 1,618 1,468
1987:2-1992:1 1,572 1,232 1,794 1,286
1988:2-1993:1 1,502 1,131 1,763 1,344
1989:2-1994:1 1,626 1,302 1,879 1,588
1990:2-1995:1 1,773 1,546 1,896 1,862
1991:2-1996:1 1,855 1,737 1,957 1,655
1992:2-1997:1 1,752 1,661 1,785 1,888
1993:2-1998:1 1,965 1,961 1,983 1,873
1994:2-1999:1 1,845 2,398 1,724 1,794
1995:2-2000:1 1,889 1,716 1,981 1,625
aFive-year observation period for women who were age nineteen in the 
year beginning with the first quarter indicated.
bLong-termers have one or two spells in the five-year observation period 
and an average spell of twenty-one months or more; short-termers have 
one or two spells in the five-year observation period and an average spell 
of twenty months or less; cyclers have three or more spells in the five-year 
observation period.
Table 5 








Potential as a Percentage 













Notes: Human capital potential is defined for each individual as her 
mean quarterly earnings, taken over those quarters in which she had 
earnings, multiplied by twenty quarters. The full-time, full-year mini-
mum wage is the earnings amount for 2,000 hours per year for five years 
at the minimum wage, $5.15 per hour.46 Changing Caseloads
the percentage of recipients who have at least twelve years of 
education, and some improvement from 1986 to 1995 in the 
fraction with some college education. Unfortunately, for 1996 
and after, only the percentage with twelve or more years of 
education has been published. There appears to be some 
negative selection on education in 1995 and after, for while the 
fraction with twelve or more years grew from 1986 to 1994, it 
then dropped in 1995 and afterward. This is consistent with the 
CPS, which also showed negative selection in this period, but 
there it was ascribed to the business cycle.22
A second source of additional evidence comes from some of 
the studies of welfare leavers conducted in the past several 
years that have compared leavers with stayers (most leaver 
studies do not conduct such comparisons). All of these studies 
focus on post-1996 data, so no control for the business cycle 
can be made. For example, Loprest and Zedlewski (1999) find 
that stayers have lower levels of education and more obstacles 
and barriers to work and, among those with obstacles, stayers 
are less likely to work. However, stayers and leavers did not 
differ on some other dimensions (such as health). Cancian 
et al. (2000) estimate probit equations for the probability of 
leaving TANF in Wisconsin and find that probability to be 
positively related to education, age, age of the youngest child, 
the number of other adults in the household, and work 
experience, and to be negatively correlated with the number of 
children and years on welfare. These all accord with selection 
on job readiness. A further investigation of the likelihood of 
leaving welfare in Wisconsin, using dependency categories 
similar to those used here for the Maryland data, finds that 
short-termers and cyclers are more likely to leave welfare than 
long-termers (Ver Ploeg 2001). A study comparing leavers 
with stayers in Illinois likewise finds stayers to be worse off in 
terms of education, experience, and marital history (Institute 
for Public Affairs and School of Social Work 2000). A similar 
study in the state of Washington finds leavers to be better 
educated, younger, in better health, and to have fewer children 
than stayers (Fogarty and Kraley 2000).23 In an examination of 
welfare leavers in Michigan, Danziger (2000) finds them to 
have higher levels of education, better adult and child health, 
more work experience and job skills, and fewer transportation 
problems than stayers. While this evidence is a bit mixed, the 
general tendency is nevertheless consistent with negative 
selection on skill and with the implication that better-off 
recipients have more likely left the rolls. Again, this is 
consistent with the CPS, although with that data set it was 
attributable to the favorable state of the economy.
A leaver examination issued by the Three-City Study is also 
indirectly relevant. Moffitt and Roff (2000) found that leavers 
in three cities (Boston, Chicago, and San Antonio) contained a 
wide diversity of different types of women—ranging from 
more educated women who were in better health and had 
relatively high employment and earnings to less educated 
women who were often in poor health and had much lower 
employment and earnings. The implication of these findings is 
Table 6
Educational Percentage Distribution of AFDC and TANF Adults, 1969-99







1979 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1995 1997 1998 1999
8 or less 37.5 21.8 18.3 11.9 13.2 12.2 9.2 7.4 10.0 — — —
9-11 39.2 41.3 40.0 35.5 35.3 34.6 35.2 32.5 28.9 — — —
12 20.4 30.9 36.2 42.9 42.0 40.5 41.9 44.6 45.4 — — —
13-15 2.6 5.1 5.2 8.4 9.4 11.9 12.7 14.3 14.6 — — —
16+ 0.3 0.9 0.8 1.2 1.4 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.1 — — —
1-6 — — — — — — — — — 5.2 5.0 5.2
7-9 — — — — — — — — — 14.1 13.2 12.3
10-11 — — — — — — — — — 28.0 29.9 31.5
12+ 23.3 31.9 42.2 52.5 52.8 53.2 55.5 59.8 51.1 52.6 51.9 51.1
Sources: For 1969-95, U.S. Congress (1998, Table 19); for 1997-99, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (1997, Table 16; 1998, Table 17; 
1999, Table 17). 
Notes: Figures shown represent the originals inflated by the fraction nonmissing. Figures for 12+ for 1969-95 are derived by summing the figures
for 12, 13-15, and 16+.FRBNY Economic Policy Review / September 2001 47
that leavers are composed not only of the better-off recipients 
in the caseload, but many of the more disadvantaged recipients 
as well. This is the flip side of the coin indicating that stayers 
are likewise composed of more advantaged as well as 
disadvantaged recipients. Both stayers and leavers are 
composed of a diverse, heterogeneous set of women who have 
a wide range of labor market skills and other characteristics. 
This again belies the conventional view of leavers as composed 
solely of better-off (former) recipients and stayers as composed 
solely of worse-off recipients.24
Another set of relevant studies are the few leaver studies that 
have compared multiple cohorts of post-1996 leavers. The 
conventional wisdom suggests that successive waves of leavers 
should be progressively worse off, presuming that the better-off 
and more job-ready recipients left first. The available studies 
provide much less support for this supposition than would be 
expected. While a study in Illinois found early leavers to be 
slightly better off than later leavers in terms of work experience, 
education, and marriage history (Institute for Public Affairs 
and School of Social Work, University of Illinois 2000), a 
succession of leaver cohorts examined in South Carolina found 
no difference in employment rates, hardship, or other 
measures (South Carolina Department of Social Services 
2000). A study of Wisconsin leaver cohorts in 1995 and 1997 
found lower earnings in the later cohort but no significant 
differences in employment or income (Cancian et al. 2000), 
and a review of three states with multiple cohort leavers—
Arizona, Washington, and Wisconsin—found very mixed 
evidence of any trend in employment (Isaacs and Lyon 2000). 
The finding of little evidence of selectivity is not consistent with 
many of the previous findings, but since most of these multiple 
cohort studies have examined only post-1996 leavers—when 
the unemployment rate decline has slowed and welfare reform 
effects have been more important—they may be more 
consistent with the CPS findings reported above, which 
indicate no statistically significant selectivity after 1996.
IV. Conclusions
The discussion in this paper concerns the effect of welfare 
reform on the composition of the caseload, and on whether 
reform has led to more or less disadvantaged recipients leaving 
the rolls. A consideration of the theoretical effects of welfare 
reform on the composition of the caseload suggests that while 
most policies should lead to a departure from the rolls of those 
who are more job-ready, who have more labor market skills, 
and who are in general less disadvantaged, several welfare 
reforms—most notably, sanctions and more generous earnings 
disregards—work in the opposite direction. 
Our analysis of national Current Population Survey data 
indicates that the skill level of the welfare caseload has tended 
to decline, but this has been primarily the result of the 
improvement in the economy; welfare reform per se, after 
one nets out the effects of the economy, has had little effect 
on the composition of the caseload in its labor market skill 
distribution. An analysis of data from Maryland indicates that 
welfare reform has had its major impact on long-term 
recipients, who are the most disadvantaged. A survey of other 
studies comparing leavers with stayers, multiple cohorts of 
leavers, and diversity among leavers and stayers, offers several 
findings. One finding is that while stayers may have been worse 
off in general than leavers—although our analysis implies that 
this is the result of the business cycle and not welfare reform—
more recent cohorts of leavers are not much different than 
earlier cohorts of leavers. In addition, studies examining the 
diversity of leavers have found many worse-off former 
recipients who have left welfare, suggesting that leavers have 
not been composed solely of better-off former recipients.
The policy implication of these findings is that policy should 
recognize that there are at least two types of low-income single 
mothers: those who have more job skills and are better off and 
those who have much lower skill levels and a much greater set 
of problems. More important, both types of women are found 
both on and off the welfare rolls. Therefore, any additional 
assistance to either or both groups—say, greater labor market 
supports to the more job-ready women and more basic 
assistance to the more disadvantaged women—should be 
directed not just at women still on TANF, but also at women off 
TANF. Policies must be designed to assist women in need of 
assistance who are in these multiple situations.Endnotes
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1.  For an exception, see Mueser et al. (2000), who find that welfare 
reform had no effect on employment rates of leavers in five urban 
areas through 1997, after controlling for the economy.
2. Because these studies examine a more comprehensive group, they 
can capture the effects of welfare reform on discouraged entry onto 
welfare as well as increased exit. 
3. It is somewhat less obvious what the influence of other sources of 
nonwelfare income should be. For example, whether women who 
have more income available off welfare from unearned sources—say, 
help from other family members—have more labor market skills or 
less skills is not as clear-cut. In addition, it is also less clear how labor 
market skill is correlated with the likelihood of moving on and off 
welfare as the result of changes in marital status.
4. Similar effects should occur in terms of welfare entry. Women with 
more job market skills are the least likely to come on the rolls for the 
most part, but they are also more likely to be able to fulfill the work 
and job-search requirements—often imposed by formal diversion 
programs—than are women in more disadvantaged situations. See 
Moffitt (1996) for a general discussion of entry effects in welfare 
programs.
5. As of October 1997, one state (Illinois) disregarded 67 percent of 
earnings and a number of states (such as California) disregarded 
50 percent of earnings, usually beyond a threshold. Other states had 
smaller disregards and a few remained with the AFDC disregard of 
zero. See Gallagher et al. (1998).
6. The 1967 and 1981 federal changes in earnings disregards in the 
AFDC program had these effects. The 1967 change increased earnings 
disregards, which led to an increase in the employment rate and 
earnings of welfare recipients and hence an increase in the skill level of 
those on welfare. The 1981 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act’s 
(OBRA) elimination of earnings disregards removed many workers 
from the welfare rolls and led to a reduction in the employment rate 
of welfare recipients. In addition, since 1996, states that have had more 
generous earnings disregards have had higher employment rates of 
recipients on TANF (U.S. Congress 2000, Chart 7-5). 
7. Another advantage of the CPS is that trends in recipient charac-
teristics will capture the effects of economic and policy changes 
working through entry rates as well as exit rates.
8. Another disadvantage of the CPS is that it appears to be increasingly 
undercounting the number of AFDC and TANF recipients compared 
with counts in administrative data. This is a serious but currently 
unresolved problem. It will not affect the results given here if the 
undercount is not related to the measures of disadvantage we use 
(education and hourly wage rate).
9. Unfortunately, hours of work per week in the past calendar year 
have been collected only since 1976. Therefore, hourly wage rates are 
measurable only from 1976 to 1998, unlike the other variables, which 
go back to 1968.
10. The sample is composed of all single mothers age sixteen to sixty-
four who reported public assistance income in the prior calendar year. 
Education is measured at the time of the March interview and the 
hourly wage is the average wage rate over the prior calendar year, in 
real 1997 dollars.
11. For the wage rate measure, only those with hourly wage rates of 
less than $30 per hour are included, for those constitute a better 
comparison group than all single mothers.
12. As emphasized previously, the inability to know from these data 
whether the work periods were in the same weeks as the welfare 
participation periods over the year leaves somewhat ambiguous the 
issue of whether this increased work occurred while on or off the rolls. 
This illustrates one of the weaknesses of the CPS for this type of 
question. However, evidence from many other sources (such as U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services [2000]) clearly indicates 
that there has been a large increase in employment and earnings 
among TANF adults subsequent to PRWORA.
13. A minor timing problem arises because UI earnings are available 
quarterly but welfare data are available monthly, so it is not possible to 
know precisely in some cases whether work and welfare periods 
overlap within a quarter. However, this is a minor problem relative to 
the major timing issues in the CPS.
14. Another disadvantage is that there is no information on hours 
of work over the quarter, so hourly wage rates—the preferable 
measure—cannot be calculated.
15. See Moffitt (2001) for an analysis of the background characteristics 
of these three types of recipients. Somewhat surprisingly, the analysis 
indicates that cyclers are, in some dimensions, worse off than long-
termers. How these groups are defined affects the answer to this 
question.Endnotes (Continued)
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16. Other age groups could, of course, be examined. We reserve that 
for future work.
17. A “spell” in our definition is a consecutive run of months of 
welfare receipt that is not interrupted by two or more months of 
consecutive nonreceipt (one-month gaps are allowed). Left-censored 
and right-censored spells are included as spells. The twenty-month 
criterion for separating long-termers from short-termers is used 
because twenty months is the mean “spell” length among those two 
groups combined.
18. Another way to say this is to suppose that the impact of welfare 
reform in Baltimore had taken place by shortening the spells of short-
termers and cyclers only, who, although having come onto welfare in 
the first place, left earlier than they would have otherwise; this is the 
usual hypothesis. In that case, the relative proportions of the three 
groups in Table 2 would not have changed at all.
19. It is interesting to note that the total time-on figures for cyclers 
have risen over time to equal those of long-termers. However, this is a 
long-standing trend and not a result of welfare reform.
20. Real earnings levels tend to be highest for short-term recipients 
over most of the period, with cyclers between short-term and long-
term recipients, who have the lowest levels. Note that this is not a 
statistical artifact of their assignment to long-term status because only 
nonoverlapping quarters with some earnings are used to calculate the 
subpopulation average amount. However, these differences have 
gradually declined and have led, in particular, to a closer match 
between long-term recipients and cyclers. 
21. On average, the young Baltimore caseload worked seven to nine 
quarters over the five-year period. There was a slight increase from 
eight to nine quarters for the last three cohorts.
22. These data are of sometimes dubious quality, for often upwards of 
40 percent of the sample is missing education information in some of 
the years.
23. A study of Medicaid leavers and stayers finds as well that leavers 
are in better health than stayers (Garrett and Holahan 2000).
24. The Danziger study (2000, Table 3) also broke out leavers and 
stayers each into those who are working and not working. 
Interestingly, Danziger found that working stayers and working 
leavers were much more similar in characteristics (such as education 
and work experience) than stayers and leavers as a whole, and that 
nonworking stayers and nonworking leavers were also more similar 
than stayers and leavers as a whole. This has the same implication: 
there is a mix of better-off and worse-off types of women in both 
stayer and leaver groups.References
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